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Purpose - Critical role of accounting and financial reporting is providing 
useful information for different and entitled users to help them in making 
economical decisions. While repeatedly it is stressed that the quality of financial 
information is a function of both the quality of accounting standards and the 
regulatory enforcement, it is vital that standard setting authorities bodies to have 
independence and suitable enforcement power to guarantee their issued standards 
implementation with accountants in preparing and releasing accounting 
information, where their enacting mechanisms differ significantly across countries, 
even being non-existent in some countries. This study seeks with aid of 
Abdolmohammadi’s  enforcement powers classification of standards (2002) 
including: Reward, Legitimate, Referent, Expert and Coercive Powers, determine 
from perspective of  respondents and current condition of  accounting profession, 
which powers are dominant, besides it also tends to evaluate past performance of 
Iranian accounting regulatory.  
Design/methodology/approach - in order to test two main hypotheses of the 
study, a suitable questionnaire was used with some questions about current 
condition of enforcement ways of accounting standards in Iran. 281 questionnaires 
distributed among accounting related financial society members including: 
accountants, auditors, bank specialists, and accounting students as agents of 
financial society. After assuring of its validity and reliability, collected data tested 
by Kruskal-Wallis, Friedman, and T-test statistical methods. 
Findings - The results showed that among various enforcement accounting 
standards powers respondents believe coercive power is more apparent and main 
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from managers’ concern of blocking their companies stock dealing by Tehran 
Stock Exchange organization, besides they accept standard setting professional 
abilities. Also respondents believe that Iran’s Audit organization in standard 
setting process has had behaved unfairly and didn’t pay attention to regulate 
accounting of governmental and Not-For-Profits parts as equal as large private 
corporation accounting. 
Research limitation/implication - A key technical result is that the five 
original powers of enforcement accounting standards don’t have equal weight and 
influence on current accounting environment of Iran and to enhance disclosure 
quality and reduce information asymmetry, some work must been done to more 
highlight  powers with positive and professional  perspective. 
Practical implications - The paper will be of interest to standards setting 
authority bodies’ when regulating accounting information releasing process to 
achieve high level of market efficiency and also to academics’ investigating the 
reliability and value of current standard setting condition. 
Originality value - The paper reports an original application of accounting 
standard enforcement origins as a determinant level of dominance financial 
wisdom in financial society of Iran.  
 
Keywords:  Accounting standard, enforcement powers, Information 
asymmetry, financial wisdom, and fairness in standard setting.   
Paper type Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to improve the financial reporting quality and providing useful 
information to investors and other entitled information users, all countries in 
worldwide, provide necessary regulation and had established professional 
authorities bodies which over time changed their structure and duties because of 
the environmental change. For long time in United States, Committee on 
Accounting Procedure (CAP), Accounting Principles Board (APB) and Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), respectively handled the accounting standard 
setting Steerage. Operation of forgoing bodies resulted in the increases of 
transparency same as reduction of information asymmetry level which in the end 
by enhancing market efficiency leads to optimal resource allocation. In the same 
way other countries take steps towards more regulation of financial information 
releasing process in their new organized capital markets and similar institutions 
was formed there. It seems in most of these countries as long as capital market 
enlargement and improvement financial reporting, the level of the public financial 
wisdom was also increased and they have sophisticated and correct perceptive 
about vital role and duties of accounting regulatory authorities and standard setting 
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International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In the other hand, in these 
countries, entities are willing to be in compliance with GAAP voluntary because 
they believe and accept that these institutions have sufficient expertise members 
and also public Consent to their operation and being in compliance with GAAP 
leads to maximizing social wealth and welfare. However these organizations have 
legal support for their issued rules and standards. In united states, for instance, 
FASB has coercive and legitimate powers for enforcement of it’s issued standards 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) dictated to all corporations 
which their stocks are dealing in capital markets, that they must provide financial 
statements in accordance with FASB’ standards (legitimate power) and those 
companies that have main departure and disagreement from this GAAP upon their 
auditors reports, SEC will prohibit and prevent of those companies’ stock deals in 
market  and their accounting documents also wasn’t used and accepted in 
calculating and determining income tax amount (coercive power). However there is 
also evidence that shows market has reacted to creative reports and stock price of 
such corporations will decrease (reward power of market). 
Moreover, because of the especial condition of the governmental entities and their 
accounting, their standard setting, needs necessary attention. By considering their 
importance in society, after more challenge finally the duties of providing 
necessary rules for these economic parties are taken up from FASB and shifted to 
new organized authorities body namely GASB which issued some special rules for 
Not-For-Profit and governmental organizations of United States so far, which lead 
to improvement of the financial reporting quality in this area. 
 
2. Research problem 
Because of the vast consequences of accounting information releasing, 
especially from the economic perspective and also with attention to its wide affect 
on many parties, it is vertical that related authorities bodies have sufficient 
independence in standard setting and its implementation process. Also to assure 
that their rules have sufficient authority, it needs to be given suitable enforcement 
power for these professional bodies to guarantee their standards implementation in 
practice. The nature and degree same as ways of enacting of these regulation and 
enforcement powers differ significantly among countries. In some countries 
accounting standard setting duty is basically handled with governmental parties. So 
it seems  that these organizations have sufficient power for enforcement of their 
standards, while in those countries that accounting standard setting duties are given 
up to private bodies, it needs heavy legal support for it’s successful activation. 
However beyond the variation in standard setting mechanism, Abdolmohammadi 
(2002)  classified enforcement powers of standards upon their force origin and 
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1. Reward Power: it is supposed that capital markets have sufficient ability 
to react to misleading implementation of GAAP by companies, and those 
companies that have had major departure from GAAP in providing accounting 
information, their stock prices get declined because of the market sophistication. 
2. Legitimate Power: in those countries which standard setting duties are 
given up to private bodies, to guarantee their standards convenient implementation, 
sufficient enforcement legal power has been given them. For instance in united 
States, SEC surrendered this task to FASB which is basically a private institution, 
but SEC has obligated to support its standard practical implementation.     
3. Referent Power: because of the election of the members of the standard 
setting by business society, they accept to behave in accordance on issued standard 
with this board. So this refers to another power of standard setting bodies for 
enforcement of their rules. 
4. Expert power: in sophisticated societies and those countries with high 
level of the financial wisdom, members of the standard setting bodies are elected 
upon their professional same as experience merit and after that because of the 
professional abilities of these bodies, their issued standards very soon get common 
and accepted by public. 
5. Coercive Power:  for more guarantees to correct implementation of issued 
standards and to avoid any main devolution from GAAP, in most countries all over 
the world rigid law and serious penalty was issued for those companies which 
aren’t in accordance with GAAP. For instance in United States, SEC would prevent 
stock dealing of those companies which haven’t provided their financial statements 
in accordance with GAAP.     
Although all of forgoing powers are arranged in all countries, but the 
implemental abilities and importance of the forgoing five powers differs among 
various countries upon their environmental and social same as their political 
differences. In other hand, in those countries which supposed that have high level 
of the public financial wisdom, enforcement of the accounting standard because of 
public acceptance of positive role of these standard setting bodies to wide 
spreading transparency and reducing information asymmetry which in the end 
leads welfare enhancement of society, comes mainly from Expert, Referent and 
Reward Powers while enacting on Legitimate and Coercive Powers are not as 
important as forging three powers.  
In this study we seek to find out whether the level of the public financial 
wisdom is fairly sufficient so contributors in our financial activities have similar 
viewpoint about role of the Iran’s Audit Organization as a unique accounting 
standard setting body in Iran. Hence, first question of the research is presented in 
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1. Is the level of our public financial wisdom sufficient so that financial 
society’s members believe that main powers for enforcement accounting standards 
comparing to their Legitimate and Coercive Powers, come from public acceptance 
of their Expert, Referent and Reward Powers? 
To enrich the study and fully cover the subject we continued the research by 
evaluation of past performance of the Audit Organization of  Iran upon public 
satisfaction of its past operation around fairly attention to regulation of accounting 
activities of all affected parties which this organization have accepted it’s duties.   
By considering that in contrary to other countries, Iran’s Audit Organization 
as a unique standard setting body in our country, handles the task of the accounting 
standard setting for both of the private and governmental parts and has accepted 
it’s responsibility. However it seems because of the influences of the main groups 
on its activities this organization haven’t had operated equally and in the fairness 
manner beyond the both forgoing parts’ needs and at least around the regulation of 
governmental parts financial reporting, haven’t had done considerable effort so far, 
while un-similar to industrial countries more than half of the economic activities in 
our country are done by governmental and Not-For- profit organization. Moreover 
even between the companies, Iranian domestic accounting standards are willing to 
meet needs of large corporation which listed in Tehran Stock Exchange 
Organization while there are other entities except corporation that didn’t give their 
needs weight. Thus another question of research is presented below: 
2. Do the members of our financial society believe that Iran’s Audit 
Organization’s past performance around providing accounting rules and standards 
for both private and governmental parties have been in fairness manner and it have 
behaved in justice?   
 
3. Objectives of the study 
The aim of the present study is determining the level and scope of the 
financial wisdom dominance and permanent in our financial society upon their 
members’ perception of the vital role and position of the accounting standard 
setting bodies to wide spread transparency and reducing information asymmetry. In 
other hand, in those condition which there is sufficient public financial wisdom, 
members’ perceptive of the role and position of accounting regulation authorities’ 
bodies comes from positive view and they accept the standard and implemented 
them in financial statements providing because they believe these standards are 
arranged by sophisticated professional bodies which have adequate Expert, 
Referent and Reward Power not necessarily from negative view of worries of 
legitimate and coercive Power of this organization that may take penalty for them. 
However there are evidences that show this last perception is dominant, it may 
reflect that the public financial wisdom isn’t in high level in our society. Moreover, 
we tend to recognize and document the overall satisfaction of the past performance Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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of Iran’s Audit Organization from the perspective of equal accomplish with both 
private and governmental accounting activities regulation. In summary, while the 
final goal of the current research is providing condition to understanding of the 
positive role of the accounting standard setting boards in improvement of the 
financial reporting quality and achieve to higher level of the capital market 
efficiency, the applied objective of this study is also to highlight the various parts’ 
needs to standard setting bodies which need more attention in this era.        
   
4. Importance and necessity of the study 
While In recent years, the Iran economy has undergone a number of reforms, 
resulting in a more market-oriented economy and particularly the Government of 
Iran has taken steps towards liberalization of the economy, but it must be noted that 
more than half of economic recourses are still controlled by non-private entities 
and main part of the economic activities in our country were also done by those 
entities. However by considering the structure of the ownership of these entities 
which are public and don’t have direct entitled users and demand for their financial 
information similar to owners and stockholders of the private companies, they 
don’t have sufficient ability to influence the standard setting activities and require 
them for improvement of the quality of the their accounting and reporting standard, 
while there is a huge demand for improvement of the management’s performance 
efficiency in this area. It is expected by regulating the accounting activities of this 
area, because of the increases of transparency in the society, besides the increasing 
the level of the management’s responsibility, operational efficiency of these 
entities can be improved. Although Iran’s Audit Organization has direct 
responsibility for providing and issuing the suitable accounting standards for this 
area which is extremely un-harmonized and inconsistent, but it hadn’t have done 
considerable effort to achieve this goal yet. So each research which is done in this 
area for highlighting its problems must be supported and this study also tends to be 
done around these subjects. While the academic literature is intended foremost to 
inform the academic community, findings in the academic literature can certainly 
be relevant to regulators as well. 
 
5. Theoretical issues 
In the 1970 decade three researchers, Michael Spence, George Akerlof and 
Joseph Stiylitz (2000a) created a theory about the information economic area that 
later was known as information asymmetry theory. Upon this theory Akerlof (2002) 
considers a market condition in which sellers have more information about traded 
commodity than buyers. Certainly in this position, prices aren’t reflecting it’s fair 
and intrinsic value and depending on informative awareness difference level are 
higher or lower than its’ fair values. Similarly in those capital markets which 
information distributed unequally, sellers willing to sale their stocks and securities Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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in high price, while in the other side, buyers because of inability to access to 
sufficient information for evaluation of those stocks and presence uncertainty about 
those securities, suggest low price to acquire those stocks. In financial literature, 
the abnormal Bid-Ask spread are proposed as position of dominance information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers of securities and also the level of this 
spreading are reflecting the level of  information asymmetry among dealers. 
However, it is known that the higher the information distributing unequally and 
with aid of informal ways such as inside trading, the higher the level of information 
asymmetry and the Bid-Ask spread prices. This topic is shown in the below 
equation: 
                 (1-1) 
Which in that: 
Spread= the level of difference between ask and bid prices 
AP= Ask Price 
BP= Bid Price 
 
5-1. Role of accounting information to decrease the level of information 
asymmetry  
In order to protect investors’ rights and strengthen capital market, formerly, 
United States got steps to regulate financial reporting environment by issuing 
Truth-in-securities act in 1933 and establishing the SEC in the 1934. In the 1957 
APB as an important standard setting body was replaced to CAP and issued the 
prime principles of accounting formally. From it’s begining, APB was willing to 
provide conceptual postulates for its decisions and it must work in standards and 
concepts simultaneously so to be able to provide meaningful basic concepts for 
standards.  The motive of FASB, which replaced to APB In the 1973, from 
preparing conceptual framework, could be seen in engaged problems that its 
pervious candidate, APB experienced. However, besides formation and 
establishing the various accounting standard setting and regulatory authority’s 
bodies in worldwide, it also is considered that these organizations should have 
sufficient powers and ability to enact their issued rules for achieving the accounting 
main objective. The subject of enforcement of accounting standards has attracted 
increased attention in recent years and also enforcement mechanisms continues to 
differ significantly across countries, even being non-existent in some countries 
(Fee, 1999). Many scholars argue that the extents to which standards are enforced 
and violations prosecuted are as important as the standards themselves (e.g., 
Sunder 1997, p. 167). In particular, the quality of financial information is a 
function of both the quality of accounting standards and the regulatory enforcement 
or corporate application of the standards (Kothari 2000, P. 92). Absent adequate 
enforcement, even the best accounting standards will be inconsequential. If nobody 
takes action when rules are breached, the rules remain requirements only on paper. Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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In some environments, for example, firms behave towards mandatory requirements 
as if they were voluntary (Marston and Shrives 1996). To illustrate, even though 
accounting policy disclosures are required in most countries as well as by 
International Accounting Standards (IAS 1), (e.g., Saudagaran and Diga 1997), 
Frost and Ramin (1997) document considerable variation in accounting policy 
disclosures within and across countries.  
 
6. Review of related literature  
While academics and practitioners agree on the importance of enforcement 
as an essential element of the financial reporting infrastructure, in comparison with 
huge amount of researches which were done in various accounting and financial 
reporting areas, there has been little, if any, research on enforcement in an 
international setting traceable. One potential explanation for this is that it is not 
easy to measure enforcement across countries. It is necessary also firstly to 
determine how to operationalize enforcement. Using a sample from 22 countries 
Hope and Rotman (2002) investigated the relations between EPS forecast accuracy 
and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. They constructed a 
comprehensive measure of enforcement of five country-level factors including: 
audit spending; insider trading laws; judicial efficiency; rule of law; and 
shareholder protection law and find that strong enforcement is associated with 
higher EPS forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in 
turn, reduces analysts' uncertainty about future earnings. They also find evidence 
consistent with enforcement being more important when more choice among 
accounting methods is allowed. Cohen et al. (2004) examine whether financial 
reporting appears to have improved post-Sarbanes–Oxley. The authors have 
studied earnings management and relative earnings informativeness in two time-
period regimes that they call the “pre-Sox” period (1987 through the second quarter 
of 2002) and the “post-Sox” period (the third quarter of 2002 through the end of 
2003). The “pre-Sox” period is then further divided into two periods: the “pre-
scandal” period (1987 through the time of the Enron collapse) and the “scandal” 
period (the time of the Enron collapse through the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley). 
The authors find evidence of increasing earnings management throughout the ‘‘pre-
scandal’’ and “scandal” time periods, with the increases found primarily in poorly 
performing industries. The authors further find that the earnings management is 
positively associated with compensation derived from bonus and option 
compensation. Following the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley, they find that the trend 
of increasing earnings management reversed abruptly. This evidence suggests that 
Sarbanes–Oxley and heightened regulatory scrutiny has had a rigid impact. The Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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authors also have examined whether Sarbanes–Oxley reforms led to more 
informative earnings announcements. After controlling the reduced earnings 
management, the authors did not find evidence suggesting that earnings 
announcements were more informative. Insider trading laws may deter managers 
from manipulating earnings to profit from trading in the firm's stock. Beneish and 
Vargus (2000) provide evidence that insider trading is related to earnings 
management. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) document that insider trading laws 
exist in 87 of the 103 countries in their sample, but enforcement (i.e. prosecutions) 
occurs in only 38 cases.  Finally, Hung (2000) and Ball (2001) argue that strong 
shareholder protection should attenuate management opportunism in financial 
reporting. Managers in weak shareholder protection environments are more likely 
than managers in strong shareholder protection environments to manipulate 
earnings. For example, mechanisms by which shareholders might sue directors for 
losses incurred due to manipulated financial reports are more plentiful in the U.S. 
than in Germany (Hung 2000; La Porta et al. 1998). Hence, the higher anticipated 
cost to managers of engaging in manipulation in the U.S. might be expected to 
deter such behavior. Rezaee (2004) argues that conformity with existing 
regulations as well as recent reforms may not be sufficient to restore investor 
confidence. The author provides a supply chain paradigm with interrelated controls 
to make the reporting process more effective. Some best practices are also provided.  
Falkman and Tagesson (2004) also by using the lens of agency theory as well as 
institutional theory, and collecting data through a survey, documentary study and 
interviews, explored and explained the impact of the legislation and standard 
setting in the Swedish municipal sector. The overall results of their research 
showed that the reform has had a very limited impact on accounting practice and 
the compliance with accounting standards and legislation is in general poor. The 
study also shows that there are differences among the preparers. The supposition, 
suggested by institutional theory, that large municipalities should produce better 
accounting information more in line with generally accepted accounting principles, 
than the municipalities in general, could not be rejected. However it must be noted 
that the accounting profession is standing at the crossroads. The corporate world 
recently closed two decades of unprecedented greed and corruption. As 
accountants, we presently find ourselves with an overly complex rules-based, 
mixed-attribute accounting model, the future of which could reside in the public 
sector. We will be faced with numerous unresolved problems as we attempt to 
handle them. Some countries upon their environmental differences prefer to handle 
standard setting topic in public sector not necessarily in private sector or prefer 
principle-based comparing to rule-based standards. Wustemann and Kierzwk (2007) 
studied a central methodical and practical problem in three accounting regimes Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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including U. S. GAAP, IFRS and German GAAP which all of them pursue internal 
consistency. They investigated how management shall develop and apply 
accounting policies when specific guidance relating to particular transactions and 
events does not exist. With regard to the so-called filling of gaps, they showed that 
in an internally consistent regime management is required to choose and apply 
consistent accounting policies to comparable accounting issues in the absence of 
specific guidance. According to their analysis, the present IFRS regime fails to 
ensure this because IFRS dealing with comparable issues are partly inconsistent. 
They also documented that the complete elimination of rules and the reliance on 
principles only − as requested by many in accounting theory − is not an adequate 
solution since broad principles do not provide a sufficient structure to frame 
management’s judgment in the choice of accounting policies. They propose that 
accounting regimes should consist of principles as well as of rules and that the 
rules shall be consistently derived from high-level principles. Due to the required 
consistency between standards addressing comparable issues, management’s 
discretion in the choice of adequate accounting policies would be, from a 
normative perspective, ideally limited to one acceptable accounting treatment. In 
the other hand, while some disuse that adoption International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) by developing countries has the advantage of avoiding the high 
cost of setting up national standards, effectively using technical skills of other 
nations, but the result of the Chand’s studies about  the relevance of the 
implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) in Fiji, by 
identifying the specific needs for accounting information in the domestic economy- 
showed that the needs and the nature of the social and economic systems of 
developed countries that are behind the formulation of the IFRSs are significantly 
different from those in developing countries especially Fiji. Since IFRSs are 
demonstrably designed primarily to suit the needs of developed countries and the 
relevance of implementation of IFRSs to emerging economies is in serious doubt 
(Chand 2005). Green and Reinstein (2004) examine whether increased regulation 
and public scrutiny in the banking industry changed the frequency and/or nature of 
observed bank frauds. They examine specific characteristics of enforcement actions 
against financial service organizations between for violations committee between 
1982 and 2000. They find that the frequency of frauds did not change significantly 
across time. However, as regulatory oversight and public scrutiny increased, the 
frauds became increasingly likely to involve the withholding of information rather 
than creating fictitious information. The authors interpret their findings as 
suggesting that regulation and scrutiny can affect fraud strategies as much or more 
than fraud frequency. Tornqvist and Lumsden (2001) made a ranking of persons 
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setting bodies in Sweden during a period of ten years. This study shows that there 
are many persons who have held a position. However, there is a small group of 
persons who have held a position during many years and also in more than one 
body. Thus, they have had the opportunity to exercise larger influence than others. 
As these persons belong to various interest groups it becomes interesting to discuss 
potential effects for these groups. Furthermore, a comparison is made between the 
standard-setting bodies focusing the criteria used when selecting the members of 
the actual standard-setting units. This study shows the importance of considering 
political aspects when studying accounting standard-setting in Sweden. Historically, 
regulators have considered primarily the reliability of relevant information in 
deciding whether recognition or disclosure should be mandated.  
The SEC implemented Regulation Fair Disclosure in October 2000. This 
regulation prohibits firms from disclosing value relevant information to select 
capital market participants without simultaneously disclosing the same information 
publicly.  Some were concerned that Regulation Fair Disclosure would cause a 
decrease in the quality and quantity of information about firms because managers: 
(1) would not want to divulge too much information broadly and risk that 
competitors would exploit the information and (2) would not want to risk legal 
liability from inappropriate disclosure. Studies published in the academic literature 
have provided some information about this issue. Heflin et al. (2003) examine 
whether information flow to the capital markets before earnings announcements is 
reduced after Regulation Fair Disclosure was implemented. The authors measure 
what they term the information gap for announcements before and after Regulation 
is implemented. The information gap is the difference between the pre- and post-
earnings announcement stock price after controlling for market-wide stock price 
movements. The authors compare three post- Regulation quarters (fourth quarter of 
2000 and the first and second quarters of 2001) to the same quarters in the prior 
year, which are pre- Regulation. The final sample consists of 5,072 pairs of pre- 
and post- Regulation observations. The authors find a smaller information gap after 
Regulation Fair Disclosure was implemented. This suggests that the market 
actually had more overall information about the upcoming earnings announcements 
in the post- Regulation quarters.. Last, the authors find that firms more frequently 
offered voluntary earnings-related disclosures to the capital markets after 
Regulation Fair Disclosure was implemented. These findings suggest that 
Regulation Fair Disclosure did not cause a decrease in the overall amount of 
information made available to capital market participants. Gintschel and Markov 
(2004) use a sample of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock 
recommendations between October 1999 and October 2001 showed that the stock 
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ratios. The authors believe that analysts would have required and received more 
specific and firm-internal knowledge from these high growth firms pre- Regulation. 
The authors interpret their findings in totality as evidence that Regulation Fair 
Disclosure has reduced selective disclosures to financial analysts. Jorion et al. 
(2005) use this unique setting to examine the change in the information 
environment post-Regulation Fair Disclosure. The authors examine the change in 
the information content of ratings announcements post-Regulation. They find that 
after Regulation Fair Disclosure was implemented, credit rating upgrades lead to 
larger stock price increases and downgrades lead to larger stock price drops. This 
evidence suggests that credit rating agencies actions do contain more new 
information post- Regulation. It follows that the information available to market 
participants (other than those privy to inside information such as ratings agencies) 
dropped. It also follows that the ratings agencies gained a strategic advantage from 
Regulation Fair Disclosure. In similar direction Irani and Karamanou (2003) 
examine the change in the number of analysts following a sample of firms and the 
dispersion of the analysts’ forecasts after Regulation Fair Disclosure was 
implemented. Using sample data from 1995 to 2001, the authors, measure end of 
quarter mean number of analysts following firms and the mean earnings forecast 
dispersion for the analysts that follow the firms. They find a decrease in the 
number of analysts following firms’ post-Regulation and an increase in the forecast 
dispersion post-Regulation Fair Disclosure.  
However the difficulty in measuring enforcement arises in part because 
enforcement takes different forms in different countries. As Ball (2001, 128) puts it, 
"the accounting infrastructure complements the overall economic, legal and 
political infrastructure in all countries". But we tend to engage in attitude from 
different view, especially from financial society members’ perception of 
importance and preferences of various mechanisms which countries enact their 
regulatory power to ensure that issued rules and standards are applied in real world 
beyond the ways of the setting accounting standards. For this purpose we used  a 
classification of origin and ways of acting the enforcement accounting standards 
powers which provided by Abdolmohammadi (2002).                       
 These categories includes five distinct powers of enforcement accounting 
standards and guarantee to it’s practical implementation including Reward Power, 
Legitimate Power, Referent Power, Expert Power and Coercive Power which their 
weight and importance are variant from one country to another upon their 
environmental, Economic and legal differences and main objective of this study is 
also to trace importance and dominances of those powers in Iran’s financial society. 
The table 1 highlights this category’s components. 






















Powers and mechanisms of assuring correct implementation of  
GAAP Abdolmohammadi (2002) 
 
More over it seems that in various countries upon their market efficiency and 
also their members’ financial wisdom sufficiency, the importance and weight and   
influence abilities of forgoing five powers is different.  Relation between these two 
variables and enacting those five enforcement powers are showed in table 2 below: 
 
Table 2 
The relation between the level of the market efficiency and dominant of financial 
wisdom with importance of various enforcement powers to assure practical correct 
implementation of GAAP 
 
 High level 
        of society’s                          Permanence of                                                   Permanence of 
    financial wisdom                    Legitimate Power                                               Expert Power 
 
                                                                                           Permanence of 
                                                                                          Referent Power  
 
         Low level 
        of society’s                       Permanence of                                              Permanence of 
     financial wisdom                 Reward Power                                                 Coercive Power 
                             
 
                                              Weak level of                                                         Strange level of 
                                               capital market                                                         capital market   
 
Accountants and economic 
entities are influenced by 
various enforcement 
powers   
Expert Power of the standard 
setting bodies to assure that 
behaving in accordance with 
GAAP are resulted in wealth 
and welfare Maximization 
Reward Power of the 
market to negative 
reaction to misleading 
implementation of 
GAAP 
Coercive Power of SEC 
to prevent stock dealing of 
those companies which 
didn’t behave in 
accordance with GAAP  
Legitimate Power of standard 
setting bodies that assures those 
entities not behaving in 
accordance with GAAP would 
not be used their accounting 
documents in tax calculation    
Referent Power of 
standard setting bodies to 
enact their rules because 
of all acceptances to their 
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7. Research hypotheses 
According to the research problem and objectives of the study two main 
hypotheses and several sub-hypotheses were postulated in the study as following: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of our public financial wisdom  is sufficient that members 
of financial society believe that main powers for enforcement accounting standards 
comparing to their Legitimate and  Coercive Powers, comes from  public 
acceptance of their Expert, Referent and  Reward Power. 
Sub-hypothesis 1: Five powers of enforcement accounting standards and guarantee 
its practical implementation including: Reward, Legitimate, Referent, Expert and 
Coercive Powers don’t have equal weight and level of influences.    
Sub-hypothesis 2: Main power of enforcement accounting standards and guarantee 
its practical implementation drives from market Reward Power.    
Sub-hypothesis 3: Main power of enforcement accounting standards and guarantee 
its practical implementation drives from accounting regulatory bodies’ Legitimate 
Power.    
Sub-hypothesis 4: Main power of enforcement accounting standards and guarantee 
its practical implementation drives from accounting regulatory bodies’ Referent 
Power.    
Sub-hypothesis 5: Main power of enforcement accounting standards and guarantee 
its practical implementation drives from accounting regulatory bodies’ Expert 
Power.    
Sub-hypothesis 6: Main power of enforcement accounting standards and guarantee 
its practical implementation drives from accounting regulatory bodies’ Coercive 
Power.    
  Hypothesis 2: Respondents believe accounting regulatory bodies don’t pay 
attention in expected level to regulate governmental and Not-for-Profit and small 
Organizations accounting as part of their duty.       
 
8. Research methodology 
Because this study tends to determine and describe the level and scope of the 
financial wisdom dominance in our financial society upon their members’ 
perception of the vital role and position of the accounting standard setting bodies, it 
is classified as applied research. Moreover, by considering that the current 
researches focuses on abilities of various powers to enact accounting enforcement 
rules and we are associating with numerous individuals of accounting environment 
and system, hence the research method in this study is descriptive. For determining 
study domain, Social theories generally and organization theories specially are 
analysis in three levels including; micro, macro and medium. The level of analysis 
of this study upon its captured individuals is macro. Also for handling troublesome 
attitudes which is the case of hypothesis in this study, the focus of analysis is 
determining level of influence of financial wisdom in our society. Finally similar to Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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other Survey studies that unit of analysis is human; in current study also the unit of 
analysis is the entire engaged individuals in providing, handling, controlling, 
disclosure same as using of accounting information process.  
 
8-1. Data Collection and sample 
In order to test the hypotheses, financial society of Iran constitutes our 
statistic population, so we considered accountants, auditors, stock analysts, bank 
specialists and accounting students as agents of financial society. By considering 
the research methodology and objective of the study condition, the suitable tool for 
gathering such data is questionnaire. So for getting accurate answers to the study 
questions, the authors design and developed a questionnaire which is the most 
suitable for this study. The questionnaire contains two parts namely (A) bio-data 
and (B) this section includes several questions regarding the condition of the 
accounting standard setting and enforcement of those standards and also level of 
satisfaction from their bodies’ past performance in Iran. Five-Point Likert Scale 
questionnaire was employed in this research. The Five-Point Likert’s scale having 
the ratings of “strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (5) were used. Before 
distributing the questionnaires with using of Delphi and getting aid of experts we 
get assured of validity of questionnaire. After that in order to test its permanence 
Cranach’s Alpha method was employed. Because the results of Cranach’s Alpha 
stood at 0.89 that is larger than minimum level of 0.7 so it shows that the study 
questionnaire has sufficient Reliability.  
 
9. Results of analyses 
Out of 400 questionnaires which distributed for gathering data, 281 usable 
questionnaires were collected from the different participants. 233 questionnaires 
were collected from B.A degree students and 48 questionnaires were collect from 
M.A and PhD students. Table 3 shows the general information of the participants.  
 
Table 3 
Demographic information of participants 
 
The age of participants  Overall frequency  Percentage 
Under 25  25  9% 
Between 26 to 30  109  40 % 
Between 31-35  84  30 % 
 Over 35  63  21% 
 Gender of participants  Overall frequency  Percentage 
 Male  176  63% 
 Female  105  37% 
Educational background  Overall frequency  Percentage 
 Bachelor degree  233  83% 
 Master & PhD degree  48  17% 
Field of study  Overall frequency  Percentage 
Accounting  195  70% 
Management & Economic  86  30% Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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Experience  Overall frequency  Percentage 
Less than 5  98  35% 
Between 6-10  106  38% 
Between 11-15  42  15% 
More than 15  35  12% 
Work area  Overall frequency  Percentage 
Accountant & manager  194  69% 
Stockholder & analyst  10  4% 
 Bank specialist  26  10% 
 Auditor  35  12% 
Accounting student  16  5% 
 
According to this table, majority of participants, 109 participants have age of 
between 26 to 30 years old (39 per cent); further 63 per cent of participants were 
male in contrast only 37 per cent of participants were female. Also 194 participants 
are working as accountants and financial managers (69 per cent).  To conclude that 
majority of the participants were male as well as they were accountants of entities. 
As mentioned before, in present study two main hypotheses as well as 
several sub-hypotheses were postulated; hereunder the testing of hypotheses is 
elaborated.  
Testing of hypothesis 1: 
 
9-1. Testing of first sub- hypothesis: 
First sub-hypothesis tends to determine whether there is sufficient financial 
wisdom in our financial society that they believe main powers for enforcement 
accounting standards comparing to their Legitimate and Coercive Powers comes 
from public acceptance of their Expert, Referent and Reward Powers. In the other 
hand, form various respondents’ viewpoints about five powers of enforcement 
accounting standards including: Reward, Legitimate, Referent, Expert and 
Coercive Powers don’t have equal weight and merit.  Statistical expression of this 
sub-hypothesis is presented in below: 
           
             H0:      µ1= µ2= µ3= µ4= µ5 
                 H1:      there is at least a case that differs from other   
 
Where µ1, µ2 and so on are reflecting median answers of respondents of 
importance of enacting forgoing powers to assure practical implementation of 
issued standards. 
Because of ordinal scale of the study’s data, for analyzing this hypothesis we 
employed Kruskal-Wallis nonparametric statistical methods. Table 4 shows the 


































As the result of the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that P-Value is less than α 
(P-Value=0.00<   α =0.05). So, for this sub-hypothesis the H0 rejected and there is at 
least a case that its mean is different from others. Remainder second to sixth sub-
hypotheses seek by ranking the weight of five forgoing powers with aid of 
Friedman ranking test, besides recognizing case which make differences, determine 
importance and, level of influences of each power in enforcement standard process.     
Testing of second to sixth sub- hypotheses: 
In order to test these hypotheses and ranking the importance and preferences 
of forgoing powers we used Friedman test which result of this test is presented 
below: 
 
            H0:  five powers for enforcement accounting standards have same rank. 
            H1: five powers for enforcement accounting standards don’t have same rank. 
 
Upon the result of Friedman test, P-Value of these hypotheses test is less 
than  α (P-Value=0.000 < α=0.05), thus in the significant level of the .5,  H0 
rejected and there is meaningful difference among five compared powers’  rank 
which result of test is summarized in Table 5, below: 
Table 5 
Result of Friedman ranking test 
 
Compared enforcement powers  Mean rank  Rank result 
Reward Power  2.65  5 
Legitimate Power  2.89  4 
Referent Power  2.92  3 
Expert Power  3.17  2 
Coercive Power  3.37  1 
 
Upon the Friedman ranking test results among various enforcement 
accounting standards powers respondents believe coercive power is more apparent 
while they accept sufficient experience and public agreement for their operation is 
in later level of importance. In the other hand result of Friedman test  shows that 
the main origin and motivation for preparing accounting  reports in accordance to 
GAAP comes from managers’ concern of blocking and preventing their Internal Auditing & Risk Management     ___________________          Anul V, Nr.2(18), Iunie 2010 
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companies’ stock dealing by Tehran security Exchange organization besides 
accepting standard setting professional abilities. Hence by considering the ways of 
arranging sub-hypothesis 2 to 6 only for sixth sub-hypothesis are null hypothesis is 
rejected in significant level of .95, and for remainder of sub-hypotheses H1 are 
rejected.     
 
9-2. Testing of hypothesis 2 
This hypothesis is tend to document that respondents believe accounting 
regulatory bodies don’t pay attention in expected level to regulate governmental 
same as  Not-for-Profit Organizations’ accounting as part of their duty. For testing 
this hypothesis because of the quality of the data gathering with aid of Five-Point 
Likert Scale questionnaire, we suppose that in condition when the mean answers of 
the respondents is less than 3, so they are satisfied about last performance of the 
Audit Organization from perspective of behaving fairly with both private and 
governmental parts regulation and vies versa. Statistical expression of this 
hypothesis is also presented below:  
 
                    H0:   µ ≤ 3 
                    H1:   µ > 3 
 
Where, µ is median answers of respondents about degree of injustice and 
unfairly behaving of Audit organization in relation regulatory process of 
governmental and also Not-For-Profit entities same as private large corporation 
entities. However we employed T-test method to test this hypothesis which results 
are shown in table 6, below: 
Table 6 
































As result of inferential statistics in Table 6, H0 rejected in 0.95 meaningful 
levels (α=.05> P-Value=00). In the other hand, respondents believe that Iran’s 
Audit organization in standard setting process has had behaved unfairly and don’t 
pay attention to regulation of government and Not-For-Profits parts’ accounting as 
equal as private entities accounting. 
 
 




In order to reduce negative consequences of information asymmetry in 
capital markets, accounting system and respectively accounting profession get 
responsible to provide necessary regulation and mechanism to meet financial 
informational needs of the contributors in capital market in world wide. As long as 
market enlargement, duties and role of accounting profession and it’s standard 
setting bodies has changed and increased and for assuring of practical 
implementation of their rules are given necessary enforcement powers to these 
bodies. However the present structure of financial reporting system and its 
usefulness is universal in the sense that it meets the requirements of users 
independent of culture. The results of this survey showed,  level of our public 
financial wisdom isn’t as expected as adequate in our financial society and their 
members believe that main power and motivation for implementation of accounting 
standards by entities’ managers comes from their concern of blocking their 
companies’ stock dealing by Tehran security Exchange organization, instead of 
accepting standard setting professional abilities  or referent power of this boards 
and this last powers has placed in later importance. Moreover upon the result of the 
second hypothesis test, respondents believe accounting regulatory bodies don’t pay 
attention in expected level to regulate governmental and Not-for-Profit 
Organizations’ accounting as part of their duty and at least around the providing 
necessary accounting rules for  governmental and public sector  haven’t had done 
remarkable work so far.  
 
10.1. Suggestions 
With due attention to results, in order to enhance disclosure quality and 
reduce information asymmetry, some work is necessary to be done in two distinct 
areas,  simultaneously. Firstly, it needs to wide spread and strengthen general 
knowledge and awareness about vital role and position of the accounting standard 
setting in our society. However in the other side,  it seems that it is necessary to 
revaluate the operational objectives and aims of standard setting bodies, at least 
there needs to be a periodical oversight on activities of this organization to assure 
they operate along their stated goals. While some have justified that for achieving 
equal and perpetual development in accounting regulation process, it is probably 
preferable with aid of other countries’ experiences, to establish a new especial 
standard setting bodies for governmental and Not-For-Profit organizations, similar 
to GASB in United state and dividing governmental entities’ standard setting duties 
from private ones entirely, but because of Iran’s entities environmental operating 
differences  it needs some more work in this area. However to achieve to high level 
of financial transparency goal in our country in future is highly depended to handle 
this problem.             
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